We provide a broad characterization of the supply chain settings in which perfect coordination can be achieved with a simple wholesale pricing scheme based on constant unit wholesale prices or a single quantity discount scheme. We confine ourselves to two-echelon chains with a single supplier servicing a network of retailers who compete with each other by selecting retail prices (Bertrand competition) or sales quantities (Cournot competition).
Introduction
The recent literature on decentralized supply chains has focused on the two extremes on the centralization spectrum, i.e., (1) a fully decentralized system in which each retailer chooses all of his policy variables (his retail price or sales quantity as well as his replenishment strategy), and (2) a fully centralized system in which all retailer prices, sales quantities and the complete chain-wide replenishment strategy are determined by a single decision maker. However, many supply chains have implemented intermediate or hybrid forms of centralization/decentralization. The so-called Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI) partnership continues to give each retailer the right to specify his own retail price (or sales quantity) but delegates the entire replenishment strategy for the complete chain to the supplier. Some VMI partnerships transfer ownership of the goods to the retailers when they are received there, so that the retailers continue to incur the carrying costs of their inventories. Other, increasingly popular, VMI partnerships transfer all of the carrying costs for the retailer's inventories to the supplier, along with the responsibility for the supply chain wide replenishment strategy.
This consignment arrangement may, for example, be implemented by the retailer paying the supplier only at the time the items are sold.
1 We refer to VMI arrangements without consignment as 'VMI-' and to those with consignment as 'VMI+.'
The objective of VMI partnerships is clearly to improve the aggregate performance of the supply chain. For example, the supplier typically sells the same or related items to several independent retail organizations, each of which may have multiple storage facilities.
The VMI arrangement permits the supply chain to take advantage of economies of scale in the production and distribution process; moreover, centralizing the replenishment process allows inventories to be managed on the basis of actual consumer demand patterns and avoids retailers inflating (forecasted) orders to "ensure" that the supplier maintains ample stock levels. Indeed, Buzzell and Ortmeyer (1995) report that the introduction of VMI partnerships at Dillard Department Stores, JCPenney and Wal-Mart has resulted in sales increases of 20 to 25% and 30% inventory turn improvements. Furthermore, VMI partnerships are believed to have resulted in lower retail prices, see e.g. Nelson and Zimmerman (2000) . 1 Andel (1996) , in discussing VMI arrangements, quotes a J.D. Edwards executive stating: "The WalMarts of the world want to get to the point where they don't even own the goods sitting on the shelf.
They want their vendors to capture the POS transaction which says: it's been bought, so now you can bill Wal-Mart." 2 This article illustrates the effect VMI partnerships have had on supply chain performance with a descrip-Nevertheless, the implementation of VMI partnerships is organizationally challenging and often requires major investments in information sharing technology and systems. For example, Wal-Mart spent billions to develop Retail Link, connecting its stores with participating vendors via dedicated satellite communication systems. Most recently, Wal-Mart has required its 100 top suppliers to tag all of their pallets with the new Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags to improve the performance of their VMI partnership. This initiative alone involves the purchase of 1 billion tags at a cost anywhere between 5 cents and 20 cents a piece. Other companies need to rely on third-party software and consulting services.
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At the same time, we have learnt from the industrial organization literature in economics, marketing and operations management that aggregate profits in a supply chain can be elevated to the maximum possible, i.e., first-best level, simply by adopting an appropriate pricing scheme for the vendor's sales to the retailers. Moreover, the coordinating pricing scheme is often very simple, based on constant per unit wholesale prices or a single quantity discount scheme with the per unit wholesale price a decreasing function of the retailer's order size. If "clever pricing" is all that is needed to achieve supply chain coordination, why do we need initiatives such as VMI, which, as mentioned, are costly to implement?
One reason why such initiatives are necessary is the fact that simple pricing schemes, while sufficient by themselves in certain settings, fail to achieve perfect coordination in other settings of seemingly equal or greater simplicity. Consider, for example, a supply chain with a single supplier distributing a single product to multiple retailers over an infinite horizon.
The demand at each retailer arrives continuously at a constant rate that is a decreasing function of this retailer's price. Due to the presence of fixed and variable procurement costs (along with linear inventory carrying costs), inventories are replenished in batches. Chen et al. (2001, Theorems 1 and 2) have shown that, in a traditional decentralized setting, no nonlinear order quantity discount scheme necessarily achieves (perfect) coordination, even if the retailers face identical cost structures. 4 Instead, the authors show that a perfect coordination tion of the highly successful partnership between Kimberly-Clark and various retailers such as COSTCO. The article quotes Berner, chief U.S. economist at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, as stating that improved supply chain management has played a major role in the continuous decline of retail prices for general merchandise over the past 3 years. 3 For example, PRC Consulting, Simpson, Knowledge Stores. 4 The authors show that this holds, even when the demand rate depends linearly on the retail price; moreover, no all-unit or incremental discount scheme achieves coordination even when the demand rates and retail prices are exogenously given, irrespective of how many discount price levels are used.
scheme requires an upfront agreement between the chain members to place all orders only at a specific, discrete set of replenishment epochs and it involves three separate discount schemes, each based on a different retailer attribute (i.e., the size of the retailer's orders, the frequency with which orders are placed and his cumulative sales volume). Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) have shown that these results continue to apply when the retailers are engaged in price-or quantity competition, i.e., when each of their demand rates depends on all retailers' price levels. We refer to this as the Standard Cost model. (More on this later.)
Our main objective is, therefore, to provide a broad characterization of the supply chain settings in which perfect coordination can be achieved with a simple wholesale pricing scheme based on constant unit wholesale prices or a single quantity discount scheme. Price Discount Sharing scheme (PDS). Here, the supplier subsidizes or compensates the retailer for part of the discount the retailer provides from a given list price. These PDSs have become popular, see Ailawadi et al. (1999) and Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) . volume, see e.g., Brown and Medoff (1990) , Stein and El-Ansary (1992) and Munson and Rosenblatt (1998) . The traditional explanation for why larger retailers get lower wholesale prices is either because the cost of doing business with them is lower or because they have larger bargaining power or superior information (see e.g., Schiller and Zellner 1992) . Our explanation for this phenomenon does not require any of these conditions.
Under both the linear and non-linear coordination schemes, double marginalization is present, i.e., a positive margin prevails between the per unit wholesale price for a given retailer and the marginal (or average) cost he imposes on the other chain members, as well as a positive margin between the per unit wholesale price and the retail price. We show that the first margin increases with the retailer's "competitive impact", a measure for the degree of competition this retailer presents to the market, and decreases with his market share.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief review of literature documenting VMI arrangements and publications addressing related models for supply chain coordination. Section 3 introduces the general model and notation. In Section 4, we describe our results for the Standard Cost model under 'VMI+' and 'VMI-', comparing the coordination schemes with the more complex schemes required in a traditional system without a VMI arrangement. In Section 5, we derive the coordination schemes for the general model under echelon operational autonomy. Section 6 reports on a numerical study comparing market equilibria and coordination schemes in different settings, while Section 7 completes the paper with some general conclusions. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Literature Review
One of the first VMI partnerships was formed between Wal-Mart and Procter and Gamble.
This initiative was followed by other discount store chains, such as Kmart, which by 1992 had developed over 200 VMI partnerships. It has been estimated that by 1999, 12% of retail sales of hard goods were governed by VMI arrangements, and 20% of all sales by retail organizations with annual sales of $5 billion or more, see Andel (1996) , quoting a study by the International Mass Retail Association (IMRA). The adoption of the VMI business model has been documented in general (see Schonberger 1996) , as well as for specific industries, e.g., Buzzell and Ortmeyer (1995) for the retail industry, Thomas and Strickland (2001) for the PC industry (in particular, Dell computers) and Barnes et al. (2000) for the case of electronic manufacturing service (EMS) providers. Specific company case studies include Hammond (1995) on Barilla SpA, an international pasta producer, and Shapiro and Isaacson (1994) on Bose, a consumer electronics manufacturer.
Recent analytical models that characterize the benefits of VMI arrangements in settings with exogenously given demand processes are Cachon and Fisher (1997) , Narayanan and Raman (1997) , Aviv and Federgruen (1998) and Mahajan and van Ryzin (1999) . See Clark and Hammond (1997) and Cachon and Fisher (1997) for some empirical studies about VMI. Netessine and Rudi (2001) address the drop-shipping arrangement, a variant of VMI under which the supplier ships directly to the customer without keeping inventories at the retailers. Jeuland and Shugan (1983) represents one of the earliest papers on coordination mechanisms in supply chains. The authors consider a single period model for a chain with one supplier and one retailer facing a general downward sloping demand function: both the supplier and the retailer incur costs which are proportional with the sales quantity (possibly in combination with a one-time fixed cost). The authors show that a simple quantity discount scheme results in perfect coordination. Moorthy (1988) showed that, in this model, perfect coordination can also be achieved with a constant per unit wholesale price, albeit that it needs to equal the supplier's (constant) marginal cost rate; the scheme can be complemented with a fixed franchise fee (giving rise to a two-part tariff) to achieve any desired allocation of the supply chain wide profits between the supplier and the retailer. Parry (1995, 2000) allow for two non-identical competing retailers facing linear demand functions. They show that perfect coordination cannot be achieved by any uniform constant wholesale price.
Instead, they obtain perfect coordination by discounting the (common) wholesale price as a linear function of the retailers' purchase volumes. Unfortunately, it is unclear how the scheme can be generalized for industries with more than two retailers or more complex cost and demand structures. Raju and Zhang (1999) consider another model variant with one dominant retailer capable of singlehandedly setting the retail price, which is then adopted by all other retailers. The authors show that if all chain members face a linear cost structure, perfect coordination can be achieved with a constant per unit wholesale price which, as in Moorthy (1988) , needs to be equal to the supplier's marginal cost.
In the economics literature, Katz (1989) , O'Brien and Shaffer (1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994) consider a single supplier -multiple retailer model with an arbitrary number of non-identical retailers. They assume that the supplier offers a retailer-specific wholesale price and franchise fee to the retailers. Without specifying any specific demand model or cost structure, it is assumed ex ante that the resulting price-or quantity game among the retailers has a unique Nash equilibrium under which the retailers' profits satisfy various first and second order monotonicity properties with respect to the supplier's wholesale prices.
We refer to Lariviere (1999) , Tsay et al. (1999) and Cachon (2001) for recent surveys of a variety of coordination mechanisms. Most of the existing models continue to assume a single supplier and retailer, however allowing for considerably more realistic operational cost structures than those in the economics and marketing literature. Cachon (2001, §2.8 ),
for example, shows that in a single period model where the retailer faces uncertain demand with a given distribution and exogenously specified retail price, the retailer can be induced to acquire the supply chain wide optimal inventory volume with a constant wholesale price or a wholesale price specified as a non-linear function of the purchase quantity. However, with a single retailer, the coordinating constant wholesale price must equal the supplier's unit procurement cost rate, see Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) . In the same single period setting, Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) show that, under minor regularity conditions, a vector of constant wholesale prices results in perfect coordination, even when the supplier serves an oligopoly of competing retailers, whose demand distribution is a general function of all of the retailers' prices. Bernstein and Federgruen (2001b) show that a set of constant wholesale prices continues to induce perfect coordination when the retailers purchase repeatedly from the supplier in an infinite horizon setting, as long as stockouts at the supplier are cleared by procurements from a back-up or emergency source. This result applies both when stockouts at the retailers are backlogged and when they result in lost sales. The key is that all chain members' replenishment strategies maintain echelon operational autonomy.
The Standard Cost model, in which echelon operational autonomy is absent, was first addressed by Weng (1995) albeit with identical and non-competing retailers. In this special case, a quantity discount scheme based on individual order sizes induces perfect coordination. Chen et al. (2001) show that such schemes fail, in general, with non-identical retailers; perfect coordination can be achieved but only by combining three separate discount schemes. The results in Chen et al. (2001) were extended by Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) for the case of competing retailers facing a general set of demand functions.
The Model, Basic Notation and Preliminaries
Consider a two echelon supply chain with a supplier distributing a single product (or closely substitutable products) to N retailers who in turn sell the product to the consumer market.
Demand at each retailer is determined by a general demand function of the prices charged by all retailers. All demands must be satisfied in their entirety. Let is invertible everywhere. By the inverse function theorem, the inverse demand functions are then uniquely determined and continuously differentiable as well. Since the retailers' products are substitutes, any firm's demand is decreasing in its own price and increasing in the price of any of its competitors:
The following are commonly used classes of demand functions which satisfy (1):
with λ > 0 and C i , k i > 0 for all i;
p r j with r < 0 and γ > 0.
Without loss of practical generality, if a retailer increases his price, this will not result in an increase of the industry-wide sales. This gives rise to the following dominant diagonal condition:
As to the inverse demand functions, substitute products imply that each firm's price decreases when this firm or any of its competitors increases the targeted sales volume, i.e.,
Under (D), (1) implies (2). Note, however, that the inventory dynamics and hence the costs incurred by the supplier depend on all of the replenishment intervals. In other words, the supplier's costsh 0 do not just depend on σ 0 but on the operational decisions {σ i : i = 1, ..., N } as well. At the same time, a VMI arrangement endows the supplier with the ability to determine the retailers'
6 See Proposition 1 in Bernstein et al. (1999) for a necessary and sufficient condition for this implication.
replenishment frequencies and epochs. Thus, while echelon operational autonomy fails in a traditional decentralized system, it is established by a VMI arrangement.
The supplier charges each of the retailers for their purchases according to a given pricing scheme and determines her operational decisions σ 0 so as to induce perfect coordination.
The following summarizes the sequence in which decisions are made:
Step 1: A wholesale pricing scheme is specified.
Step 2: The retailers simultaneously select their retail price (Bertrand competition) or sales volumes (Cournot competition).
Step 3: The supplier chooses her operational decisions σ 0 .
Step 4: The retailers choose their operational decisions σ i , i = 1, ..., N .
The implication of the echelon operational autonomy assumption {(3), (4)}, is that for any given vector of sales volumes q, the operational decisions are determined as follows: first, each retailer i selects σ * i (q, σ 0 ) to minimize his own costh i ; on the basis of these response functions, the supplier selects σ * 0 (q). This gives rise to reduced cost functions h 0 (q) and
In some applications, the retailers may face a stochastic demand process, whose distributions depend on the price vector; for example, in an infinite horizon model, the vector of demands faced by the retailers may be i.i.d. with each period's demands described by a general system of stochastic demand functions. Our model continues to apply, in such settings, with q i interpreted as the expected demand faced by retailer i (per unit of time), provided all expected cost components depend on the vector of expected demands q only.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the h i (·) functions are increasing in the q i - i for given constants γ i , τ i > 0; see e.g., Corstjens and Doyle 1981 and Curhan 1973 .) Assume H i ≥ 0 for all i, i.e., that the cost of carrying a unit at retailer i is at least as large as the cost of carrying it in the supplier's warehouse. In the traditional decentralized setting, the fixed cost for a given delivery to retailer i may be borne part by the supplier and part by the retailer. Let K s i and K r i denote these respective parts; clearly,
Consider now the supplier's inventory carrying costs. In a traditional decentralized system, σ i , the operational decisions controlled by facility i, is given by its replenishment strategy, i.e., the epochs at which the facility places orders as well as the order sizes. Retailer i's inventory carrying costs depend only on that retailer's operational decisions σ i . However, while the input process of the supplier's inventory depends only on the supplier's operational strategy σ 0 , her output process depends on the collective strategies {σ 1 , ..., σ N }. For example, assume that each retailer i places orders every T i time units; such constant replenishment intervals are, in fact, optimal for the retailer under constant per unit wholesale prices, with T i given by the well known EOQ-formula. The resulting aggregate order stream for the supplier is, in general, highly non-stationary, represents a difficult managerial problem, and it is unknown what an optimal corresponding replenishment policy for the supplier looks like.
While attempting to achieve perfect coordination, one would like to reduce the system-wide annual delivery and inventory costs to its minimum level C(q) in a fully centralized system. This cost function, too, is hard to characterize. However, Roundy (1985) showed that the
The function C(·) restricts the T -vectors to power-of-two multiples of a base period T b .
For such power-of-two vectors T ,C(q, T ) is the cost of a policy under which the supplier replenishes her own inventory every T 0 time units and retailer i every T i time units: the first term represents the variable procurement costs, the second and third term the fixed replenishment and retailers' inventory costs and the last term the carrying cost for the supplier's inventory. Since C(q) ≤ C(q) ≤ 1.02C(q) and since C(q) is the cost of a simple (power-of-two) policy, we use C(·) to represent C(·). Let T * (q) = the vector of power-of-two values that achieves the minimum in (5),
The vector T * (q) can be computed in O(N log N )-time (see Roundy 1985) .
As stated, the last term inC(q, T ) denotes the carrying cost for the supplier's inventory.
It depends on all of the T -values, i.e., on all of the chain members' operational strategies.
Thus, even when the chain members use only power-of-two policies, there is no echelon operational autonomy in the traditional chain. More formally, in the traditional system,
Thus, in the traditional system (3) is violated, i.e., echelon operational autonomy fails to apply.
Indeed, the example in Theorem 1 in Chen et al. (2001) shows that no single quantity discount scheme, i.e., no scheme under which the wholesale price w is specified as a decreasing function of the sales volume, achieves coordination even in the special case where the retailers do not compete. The same example can be used to show that no scheme with constant, though possibly retailer-dependent, wholesale prices induces perfect coordination. (2003) show that, for starters, coordination requires that the retailers agree upfront to choose their replenishment intervals from the set of power-of-two multiples of the base period T b . In addition, coordination requires a non-linear multi-part discount pricing scheme, where the discounts depend on several retailer attributes. In case the retailers engage in Cournot competition, the coordinating pricing scheme takes the form:
Thus, the coordinating wholesale price is the sum of three discount schemes: W 
If θ ij = θ j for all i = j, η i = θ i . See §5 for a more detailed discussion of the role of this "competitive impact" measure in the coordinating wholesale pricing scheme.
The Standard Cost Model Under a VMI Arrangement
Under a VMI partnership, the system-wide replenishment strategy is relegated to the supplier, expanding her operational decision set to σ 0 = {T }. Thus, under VMI the supplier's cost only depends on σ 0 , i.e., echelon operational autonomy is established where it fails to exist in the traditional system. The form of the cost functions {h j (·) : j = 0, ..., N } depends on whether the VMI arrangement is paired with consignment, or not.
'VMI+' In this case, all delivery and inventory carrying costs are borne by the supplier:
'VMI-' Without consignment, the supplier continues to select the same system-wide optimal replenishment policy for any given sales vector q, but, as far as inventory carrying costs are concerned, she bears only those associated with her own inventory:
Lemma 1 exhibits some important properties of the cost functions in the 'VMI+' and 'VMI-' Standard Cost models. Its proof follows from Lemma 1 in Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) . 
Lemma 1 (a)
In sharp contrast to the traditional decentralized setting perfect coordination is, under minor regularity conditions, possible with constant wholesale prices when a 'VMI+' or 'VMI-' agreement is in place, whether the retailers engage in price or in quantity competition.
Let w
, and w V MI+,C i
, denote the constant coordinating price for retailer i under the resulting four combinations. They are given by the following formulae, which result from the general formulae (22) and (24), invoking the derivatives in Lemma 1:
where η
.e., both the competitive impact measure η i in the decentralized pricing scheme (6), and the measure η 
Finally, these arrangements also allow for perfect coordination via a single non-linear wholesale pricing scheme, W 
The non-linear schemes have again two components. The first, given by the terms in squared
(q i ) and W
V MI+ i
(q i ), is the average cost the supplier incurs for retailer i.
(Recall, the first component in the constant price schemes (9)- (12) 
In summary, we have exhibited and compared the constant coordinating wholesale prices that apply to a 'VMI-' and a 'VMI+' arrangement, both under price and quantity competition.
We have also, for the case of Cournot competition, discussed the coordinating quantity discount schemes under 'VMI-' and 'VMI+' and compared them with the three-part discount scheme for a traditional decentralized setting. A concern, inherent to almost all pricing schemes, is the possible emergence of "grey" markets, where a retailer with a higher wholesale price orders "via" one with a lower wholesale price. First, differences in wholesale prices are rarely publicly known, as they arise as discounts from official list-prices in bilateral negotiations. Second, there are several mechanisms to prevent this practice. For example, customers may be required to send the service registration or warranty card with their item's serial number to the supplier. This, or the RFID tags, allows the supplier to check whether the unit is sold by the legitimate or by some other retailer. Finally, the existence of point-ofsales information systems, as required in a VMI partnership, makes it virtually impossible to "hide" grey market shipments.
The fact that different wholesale prices (price functions) are used for different retailers, may raise concerns about the schemes' compliance with federal trade laws, in particular the Robinson-Patman act, infrequently enforced as it appears to be. However, except for the markups, all differences are entirely due to differences in the marginal or average costs the supplier incurs for them; such differentials are entirely permitted under the "Cost Justification" provision in section 2(a) of the act. To justify differences in the markups, the "Meeting Competition" justification may be invoked: as soon as a retailer suggests the availability of alternative suppliers with potentially lower prices, the supplier is justified to reduce her price to whatever level is considered appropriate. Similarly, the FTC and Supreme Court have ruled that a supplier may reduce prices, on a case by case basis, so as to secure new customers from her competitors, or to retain old ones. If retailers are located in different geographical areas, the supplier may often base price differentials on perceived competitive differences in these areas. Nevertheless, differences in the markups may continue to be of (some) concern.
It is for this reason that in the Numerical Study, we explore how close to perfect coordination the system can come by adding a uniform markup to the marginal costs.
The General Model: Analysis
Consider, first, the centralized solution, where the price vector p (or the quantity vector q) is chosen to maximize the supply chain wide profit function, which is given by
The set of feasible prices P = {p : 0 ≤ p i ≤ p max } is compact. π SC , continuous in view of the continuity of the demand and cost functions, thus achieves its maximum in a vector p I , without loss of generality an interior point of P . (If p I is on the boundary, since by assumption p I i < p max , p I i = 0 for some i. In this case retailer i contributes to the system's cost without generating any revenues and can be eliminated from the system.) Therefore, p I satisfies the following first order conditions:
Similarly, the first order conditions in terms of q I = d(p I ) are as follows:
For the Standard Cost model, we refer to Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) for an efficient algorithm which applies to general demand functions.
We now give separate treatment to the cases of Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Bertrand Competition
Assume the supplier charges a constant wholesale price vector w to the retailers. This gives rise to a game between the retailers in which a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed if the game is supermodular. Since P is a lattice, the game is supermodular if
or any increasing transformation of π i has increasing differences in (p i , p j ) for all j = i. 
, i.e., as long as * i is less than or equal to 4 (≤ [τ i (1 − τ i )] −1 ) times the ratio of the gross revenues
) over the retailer's inventory/sales maintenance costs. This condition is invariably satisfied, as the empirical data in Bernstein and Federgruen (2003) show. In the Standard
Cost model under 'VMI-', a piecewise linear, concave functions is added to s i (·), see (8). As a result, the profit functions may fail to have increasing differences around the points where the slope, T * i (q), of the piecewise linear function changes. In practice, T * i (q) takes on at most three distinct values; the feasible price space can therefore be partitioned into several cubes such that (B sup ) is satisfied when the price region is restricted to one of them. Most importantly, our coordinating wholesale prices are designed to ensure that p I satisfies the first order conditions for an equilibrium, assuming these are sufficient as well as necessary.
One can always verify in any specific instance that this is the case; indeed, in all instances evaluated in our numerical study in §6, this is the case.
Lemma 2 Assume (B sup ) is satisfied. Then, (a) There exists a, possibly non-unique, Nash equilibrium for the retailers' game. (b) The set of equilibria is a lattice and in particular has a largest (smallest) element p (p).

The largest element p is preferred by all retailers. (c) Both the largest and the smallest Nash equilibrium are increasing in w.
Part (b) shows that, even with multiple Nash equilibria, the set of equilibria has a largest element p and that this equilibrium is preferred by all retailers. It can thus be assumed that the market will adopt or converge to this price vector. A unique Nash equilibrium is guaranteed under the following additional assumption, due to Milgrom and Roberts (1990) :
Assume that the profit functions π i (·|·, w) are twice differentiable for all p ∈ P , and that −
, for all i = 1, ..., N.
8 If (B sup ) applies for a specific transformation φ(·) of the profit functions, condition (B uni ) needs to apply to the transformed profit functions φ(π i ) as well.
For example, when h i = 0, the following demand functions satisfy (B sup ) and (B uni ):
w i ] and all logit-and CES-functions, where for the last three classes of demand functions, conditions (B sup ) and (B uni ) apply to the logarithms of the retailers' profit functions, i.e., with the transformation φ(x) = log(x).
As an alternative to (B sup ), (B conc ): concavity of the retailers' profit functions π i (·|·, w)
in their own price variables, represents a sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium as well, see Friedman (1977) . Multiple equilibria may again arise and little can be said about the structure of the set of equilibria and their dependence on the vector w.
If the first best solution p I is targeted as a Nash equilibrium in the retailer game, it must, as an interior point, satisfy:
, N.(20)
The vector p I satisfies the first order condition (18), which may be rewritten as:
Substituting (21) into (20), we obtain that perfect coordination can be achieved under a constant wholesale price vector w if and only if w = w B , where 
Then,
Part (b) shows that the coordination mechanism induces one margin between w B and the vector of marginal costs Katz (1989, p.679) , that any perfect coordination scheme employing linear wholesale prices, requires double marginalization. Indeed, it follows from Lemma 2(c) that, under (B sup ), a price vector strictly below (above) p I is adopted when choosing w =
The coordinating wholesale prices may differ by retailer. Ingene and Parry (1995) already showed for a special case of this model, with certain types of linear demand functions, linear procurement costs and N = 2 retailers, that perfect coordination cannot be achieved with a uniform, constant wholesale price. Their proposed coordination mechanism uses a discount scheme in which the wholesale price is linearly reduced as a function of the retailer's sales volume. Unfortunately, it is unclear how the scheme can be generalized for more than two retailers or more complex demand and cost functions.
In §5.2, we derive a second perfect coordination mechanism based on a pricing scheme under which the wholesale price is specified as a non-linear function of the retailer's sales volume. This scheme applies when the retailers engage in Cournot competition and has several advantages, discussed below. A similar non-linear scheme can be derived for the case of Bertrand competition, where it takes the form of a PDS scheme, see Footnote 5.
Cournot Competition
Assume now that the retailers compete in quantity space. When the supplier charges a constant vector of wholesale prices w, retailer i's profit function may be specified as
. Except when N = 2, the retailer game in quantity space fails to be supermodular, even for the simplest cost and demand functions. More likely, the analogue of (B conc ) applies as a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium:
(C conc ) The profit functions π i , or a strictly increasing transformation φ(·) thereof, are
If h i is linear in q i , the profit functions are log-concave for example if the inverse demand functions are themselves log-concave in their own arguments, e.g., when they are linear or Cobb-Douglas. The functions π i (·) are concave in q i if the demand functions are linear and the cost functions h i convex in q i . Also, when h i is concave in q i consider, under linear demand functions, the case where
Here,ˆ * i denotes the absolute value of the demand elasticity for retailer i (as calculated from the inverse demand function), under the equilibrium q * . Thus, the profit functions are concave as long as, in equilibrium,ˆ * i is less than or equal to 8(≤ 2[τ i (1−τ i )] −1 ) times the ratio of the gross revenues q * i f i (q * ) over the retailer's inventory / sales maintenance costs; as mentioned in §5.1, this condition is satisfied in almost all industries. In the Standard Cost model under 'VMI-', the addition of a piecewise linear function to s i may again result in local violations of the concavity of the profit functions around the points where T * i (q), the slope of the piecewise linear function, changes. In §5.1, we discussed how the existence of a Nash equilibrium can still be verified under this cost structure, either by partitioning the feasible action space into a finite number of cubes or by verifying in any given numerical instance that the targeted solution q I , which satisfies the first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium under the vector of coordinating wholesale prices, is a Nash equilibrium indeed. The same two devices apply here, in the case of Cournot competition. Once again, under the designed coordinating wholesale prices, q I always arises as a Nash equilibrium in all instances evaluated in our numerical study of §6.
The equilibrium is again unique for twice differentiable profit functions under (C conc ) and
If the centralized optimal sales vector q I is targeted as an equilibrium in the Cournot retailer game under a vector of constant wholesale prices w C , the first order conditions must be satisfied for q = q I , i.e., 0 =
The vector q I satisfies (19), the optimality conditions for the centralized solution, which may be written as
. Subsituting this identity into (23), we obtain
where
The coordinating wholesale price for each firm is thus given by the marginal cost this firm imposes on all other chain members, plus a markup which is proportional to the retailer's competitive impact. This measure was introduced in §4. We conclude: 
As under price competition, the coordinating prices imply "double marginalization": a margin between w C and the vector of marginal costs ( To illustrate Corollary 2(b), consider a system with two retailers and inverse demand functions p 1 = a 1 − bq 1 − βq 2 and p 2 = a 2 − bq 2 − βq 1 , with a 1 > a 2 and b > β. Note, η 1 = η 2 = β.
If the supplier's cost is linear, i.e., h 0 (q 1 , q 2 ) = c(q 1 + q 2 ) and h i = 0, q
The coordination scheme (24) thus provides a rationale for the widely prevalent practice of offering larger discounts to larger retailers (see Brown and Medoff 1990 and Munson and Rosenblatt 1998) , beyond those that can be justified by economies of scale in the costs. We are not aware of any other industrial organization models which justify this practice, without relying on asymmetric information or differences in bargaining power.
As with the coordinating scheme under price competition, the supplier's markups w
may be retailer specific, putting compliance with federal trade regulations in question. Beyond the various legal justifications for price differentials (see §5.1), we note that the differences in the markups vanish when the number of retailers increases without any of them gaining a predominant market share, i.e., as the market approaches "perfect competition".
It is then reasonable to assume that the η i -factors decrease to zero.
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Corollary 3 Assume (C conc ) and (C uni ) apply and lim N →∞ η i = 0 while Q I remains bounded in N . The differences between the markups for the retailers converge to zero, as N → ∞.
9 Similar to (D), without loss of practical generality, the average price in the industry will not go up if any given firm decides to increase its sales target, i.e., N j=1,j =i |∂f j /∂q i | < −∂f i /∂q i is bounded. It thus follows that individual terms in the series go to zero as N → ∞, and so do weighted averages among them.
The second perfect coordination scheme is based on average (incremental) procurement costs incurred for each of the retailers. This scheme applies to general demand functions and cost structures. In particular, its applicability does not depend on such properties as (C conc ). (Recall that in some settings, e.g., the Standard Cost model under 'VMI-', (C conc ) may fail to hold, making it more difficult to guarantee that q I arises as a Nash equilibrium under constant wholesale prices; see however the discussion above.) For i = 1, ..., N , let
, q i ) denote the "marginal" supply chain wide profit function which arises when all but retailer i are committed to the sales volume in q I , and note that it is maximized by q i = q I i . The same applies when an increasing affine transformation is applied to the profit function, as follows. Let 0 ≤ α i ≤ 1:
Similarly, when all of firm i's competitors are committed to the volumes in q I , firm i's profit function in the Cournot retailer game is given by:
Consider first the case where α i = 1. The profit functions in (25) and (26) 
, which, analogous to η i , is a measure of retailer i's competitive impact, i.e., a weighted average of retailer i's impact on his competitors' prices, per unit of sales. The scheme is remarkably similar to the constant price scheme (24).
It can be obtained by replacing the marginal cost by the average incremental cost incurred for retailer i, and η i by η avg i (q i ). We conclude, using a proof similar to that of Theorem 2:
Theorem 3 The vector q I arises as an equilibrium in the retailer game induced by the scheme (27). Thus, (27) generates a perfect coordination mechanism and for all i = 1, ..., N , Finally, Nash equilibria other than q I may arise under (27) . In this case more coordination is required to steer the channel members to q I . The equilibrium q I continues, however, to be the preferred equilibrium, since by virtue of it maximizing supply chain wide profits, q I also allows all retailers to achieve the best net profits after inclusion of fixed transfer payments.
Numerical Study
In this Section, we report on a numerical study comparing the supply chain wide performance in the Standard Cost model, in the traditional decentralized setting as well as under a 'VMI+'
or 'VMI-' arrangement. We compare the various coordination schemes that are available in these settings. We also assess, for systems with and without VMI, how much value the adoption of a coordination pricing scheme provides to the supply chain compared to when the supplier selects her (constant) wholesale prices so as to maximize her own profits. The latter situation gives rise to a Stackelberg game with the supplier as the leader. Here, the sequence of decisions is as specified by Steps 1-4 in §3, except that in Step 1, instead of a coordinating scheme, a pricing scheme is selected by the supplier to maximize her own profits. As to Step 3, in a traditional setting, the supplier chooses her operational decisions to maximize her own profits as well, but in the VMI settings she is expected to select a system-wide replenishment strategy which minimizes system-wide costs. We refer to Bernstein et al. (1999) for a discussion of efficient algorightms to compute the Stackelberg solutions.
We start with a problem set of 16 instances for a supply chain with five identical retailers, In Table 1 , we display for each instance the optimal price, sales quantity and systemwide profits in the centralized solution, followed by the equilibrium value of the coordinating wholesale prices in the traditional system W D and those under the VMI systems: four constant price schemes {w V MI−,B , w V MI+,B , w V MI−,C , w V MI+,C } and the two non-linear schemes
As the intercept of the demand functions is increased in the instances (I), the sales quantity of each retailer increases even though the price increases as well, resulting in increased profits. In the instances (II), as the slope of the demand functions increases, the optimal price p I is reduced along with the sales volume resulting in reduced system-wide profits. In the last set (III), both the intercept and the slope are increased. The net effect is a decrease in the optimal prices, along with an increase in sales volumes which more than offsets the price reduction, to result in increased profits.
Note first that in all seven schemes, the equilibrium wholesale prices follow the same pattern as p I : they increase in the first set of five instances (I), decrease in the second set (II), and decrease in the last set (III). The consistent monotonic interdependency between coordinating wholesale prices and retail prices is "predicted" for the constant prices w Yet, across the board, it is optimal to replenish every facility twice per period, i.e., T I i = 0.5 for all i = 0, ..., 5; in particular, it is never optimal to keep inventory at the supplier but to forward replenishment batches to the retailers as soon as they become ready.
The results confirm all relationships between the schemes exhibited by (13) and Corollary 1: in any given instance, the gap between the linear and non-linear schemes for VMI+ and VMI-is always $2.5. As is immediate from (13) and varies between $1.5 and $0.6. Indeed, from (16) and (17), since
, which represents the difference between the average and the marginal costs incurred for the retailer.
The coordinating constant prices, and hence the markups, are always higher when the retailers engage in price competition, as compared to quantity competition. In other words, under price competition wholesale prices need to be increased to prevent the retailers from adopting too low a retail price. The gap ranges from $0.40 and $2.70 and increases with q I . Table 2 provides insights into how much is gained by implementing a coordinating scheme.
It exhibits, for the same 16 instances, the gap between the supply chain wide profits under a Stackelberg solution (assuming the retailers compete in quantity space) versus the first best solution. The gaps vary between 9. 4% and 20.4% under 'VMI+' vs. 8.9% and 28.4% in the traditional setting. The size of the gap does not appear to be monotone with any apparent system characteristic. The gaps arise primarily because in a Stackelberg setting, the supplier greedily charges "excessive" wholesale prices forcing the retailers to adopt prices significantly above p I . The problem is sometimes compounded by the fact that replenishment frequencies are reduced (to once per period) even though the sales volumes are lower in the Stackelberg setting. As in the centralized solution, under 'VMI+', the retailers and the supplier are replenished with the same frequency, again avoiding inventories at the supplier.
In the traditional system, the supplier's replenishment frequency is half that of the retailer in 50% of the instances; in these cases, the supplier keeps inventories to reduce her fixed replenishment costs. Often, the gap under 'VMI+' is larger than in the traditional system. As discussed, one of the "limitations" of the coordination schemes is that in asymmetric instances, non-uniform wholesale prices are charged where the price differences can only in part be explained on the basis of differences in the costs incurred for the different retailers. We therefore explore how close to perfect coordination we can come, under a VMI partnership, by charging (i) a uniform constant wholesale price or (ii) the marginal cost plus a uniform 5, H 0 = 2, c 3 = 4 and H i = 7 for all i=1,2,3. We consider 7 possible values for the parameter 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 in combination with c 1 = c 2 = c = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. (As before, the retailers face Cournot competition.) The best scheme (to maximize chain-wide profits) with a uniform constant wholesale price results in an optimality gap of no more than 4.7% across all 42 instances. The second scheme (ii), where the wholesale price is specified as the marginal cost plus a uniform markup, comes even closer in achieving perfect coordination with a maximum (average) gap of 3.4% (3%). We conclude that in particular the latter scheme has potential in being considered as a close-to-perfect coordination scheme.
Conclusions
We have investigated for what types of cost structures and associated decision making authority, a supply chain can be coordinated with simple pricing schemes, i.e., either constant wholesale prices or a quantity discount scheme where the wholesale price is determined as a function of the retailer's annual sales volume. In doing so, we have confined ourselves to two echelon chains with a single supplier servicing a network of retailers who compete with each other by selecting retail prices or sales quantities.
The notion of "echelon operational autonomy" arises as a general sufficient condition for the ability to coordinate the supply chain with simple pricing schemes. This condition is also necessary under many cost structures, e.g., the Standard Cost model. When echelon operational autonomy fails to exist as, for example, under the Standard Cost model in a traditional chain, initiatives such as VMI play a fundamental role in creating echelon operational autonomy and thus enabling coordination with simple pricing schemes. We have exhibited the specific form of these coordinating pricing schemes both when the retailers engage in price-and when they engage in quantity competition. In each case, we have compared and contrasted the coordination schemes with two possible implementations of the general VMI partnership concept: (i) 'VMI+', where the supplier incurs all inventory costs and (ii) 'VMI-', where the retailers continue to incur the costs associated with their inventory. We have also compared these with the much more complex scheme that is required in a traditional chain without a VMI partnership. While simple pricing schemes are possible under 'VMI-', it is somewhat more difficult to guarantee that the targeted first best solution arises as the Nash equilibrium among the retailers; this observation provides an argument for the growing trend of implementing VMI with full inventory consignment as in 'VMI+'.
The coordinating prices invoke two margins: a first margin between a retailer's wholesale price and the marginal (or average) costs he imposes on the other chain members and a second margin between his retail price and his wholesale price. The first margin decreases with the retailer's market share and increases with the retailer's competitive impact measure.
While the coordinating pricing schemes under echelon operational autonomy are simple, they use different wholesale prices for different retailers. We have explained how, or to what extent, such schemes comply with legal requirements and how potential pitfalls such as the emergence of grey markets are avoided. Differences between the markups vanish as the number of retailers increases without any of them gaining a predominant market share. In our numerical study we have also exhibited that a modified scheme where a uniform markup is added to the marginal cost each retailer imposes on the other chain members, comes within a few percentage points of achieving perfect coordination. (Such schemes satisfy all legal requirements in the most basic possible way.) At the same time, large gaps of up to 30% may arise vis-a-vis first best solutions when the chain is not coordinated, e.g., when the supplier chooses the wholesale prices to maximize her own profits.
In more general supply chains with more than two echelons, say, echelon operational autonomy could be defined as a situation where each facility's cost depends only on operational decisions made by itself or facilities at a higher echelon. Future work should explore whether echelon operational autonomy, thus defined, provides the necessary and sufficient condition for the ability to coordinate general multi-echelon supply chains with simple pricing schemes.
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